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THE CASE FOR WIRE TAPPING
WILLIAM P. ROGERSt
WIRE tapping and the use in federal courts of evidence obtained through
or as a result of wire tapping are among the controversial subjects with which
the 83d Congress has come to grips during the current session.1 Although
it is not easy to strike a proper and satisfactory balance between individual
rights and liberties on the one hand, and public needs and interests on the
other, it is essential that every effort be exerted toward the immediate enact-
ment of a measure which will come as close to such a goal as is possible.
The modern law of wire tapping is customarily recorded as commencing
with the decision of the Supreme Court in 1928 that wire tapping and the use
in a criminal trial in a federal court of evidence obtained by wire tapping are
not violations of either the Fourth or Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.2
Since that date, Congress has enacted only one so-called wire tap law-Sec-
tion 605 of the Communications Act of 1934. Section 605 stipulates, in per-
tinent part, that "no person not authorized by the sender shall intercept any
communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, pur-
port, effect or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person.""
Although no further legislation has been enacted during the twenty years
tDeputy Attorney General of the United States.
1. On April 8, 1954, the House of Representatives passed an amended H.R. 8649.
This bill, as reported out of committee, provided in part, that:
"[I]nformation heretofore or hereafter obtained by the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice; the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2 of the Army General Staff, Department of the Army;
the Director of Intelligence, Department of the Air Force; and the Director
of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, through or as a result of
the interception of any communication by wire or radio upon the express
written approval of the Attorney General of the United States and in the
course of any investigation to detect or -prevent any interference with or en-
dangering of, or any plans or attempts to interfere with or endanger, the
national security or defense of the United States by treason, sabotage,
espionage, sedition, seditious conspiracy, violations of chapter 115 of title 18
of the United States Code, violations of the Internal Security Act of
1950.... violations of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946..., and conspiracies
involving any of the foregoing, shall, notwithstanding the provisions of sec-
tion 605 of the Communications Act of 1934. . .. be deemed admissible, if
not otherwise inadmissible, in evidence in any criminal proceedings in any
court established by Act of Congress, but only in criminal cases involving
any of the foregoing violations."
The House amended H.R. 8649: Wire tap evidence "heretofore" obtained with the ap-
proval of the Attorney General would be admissible in court, but wire tap evidence "here-
after" obtained would not be admissible unless a federal district or circuit judge had also
approved the wire tap. 100 Cong. Rec. 4635 (April 8, 1954).
2. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
3. 48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. 605 (1946).
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which have elapsed, the law has steadily developed as cases posing varying
questions involving Section 605 have been adjudicated.4 For example, in re-
versing a judgment of conviction on an indictment charging the violation of
the Anti-Smuggling Act and conspiracy, the Supreme Court in the first Nar-
done case held that "no person" as used in Section 605 embraces federal agents
and "divulge... to any person" embraces testimony in a federal court.5 In
the second Nardone case,6 it held that not only were the intercepted conver-
sations to be excluded from evidence, but evidence procured through the use
of knowledge gained from such conversations was likevise to be excluded.7
On the same day, a unanimous Court reversed a judgment of conviction for
mail fraud, holding that Section 605 applies to intrastate as well as inter-
state communications. 8
It has long been the position of the Department of Justice that the mere
interception of telephone communications is not prohibited by federal law.
Assuming that this interpretation of the statute is correct,9-there has been
no judicial holding to the contrary--the law is "thorouglfdy unreasonable and
unrealistic." 10 It permits the interception of communications by business com-
petitors, private detectives, busybodies, and others without federal restraint.
Yet, law enforcement officials possessed of intercepted information vital to the
security of the nation may not use such information in bringing spies and
saboteurs to justice in our federal courts.
THE NEED FOR WiRE TAPPINTG
Wire tapping by law enforcement officials is a necessary concomitant of
our present-day pursuit of spies, saboteurs, and other subversives. It is no
4. E.g., United States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 88 (2d Cir.), ccri. denied, 311 U.S. 653
(1940) (§ 605 prohibits the use in evidence of information intercepted with the consent
of one party to a telephone conversation); Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114
(1942) (§ 605 does not render inadmissible the testimony of witnesses who, were inducol
to testify by the use, in advance of trial, of intercepted communications to which the de-
fendants were not parties) ; Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (use of a
detectaphone on wall of adjoining room is not an "interception!' within prohibitions of
§ 605); Schwartz v. Te-xas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952) (§ 605 does not preclude use of wire
tap evidence in criminal proceedings in state courts). See also Rosenzweig, The Law of
Wire Tapping, 32 CoxEut. L.Q. 514; 33 CORNELL L.Q. 73 (1947).
5. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
6. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
7. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, termed such derivative evidence
as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Id. at 341.
8. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
9. "The congressional act as construed by the Supreme Court does not make wire-
tapping an offense, but the interception and disclosure of the contents of the message con-
stitute the crime. Both acts are essential to complete the offense." United States v. Cop-
Ion, 91 F. Supp. 867, 871 (D.D.C. 1950), rcv'd on other grounds, 191 F.24 749 (D.C.
Cir. 1951).
10. Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., in identical letters of May 7, 1953, to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Vice President, transmitting a vire
tap legislative proposal.
19541
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
worse, when used by proper officials and subject to adequate safeguards, than
is the use of informants, decoys, dictaphones, peeping, and the like-all of
which have been accepted practices for many years. Moreover, every Attor-
ney General, commencing with William D. Mitchell in 1931, has endorsed the
desirability and need for the use of wire tapping as an investigative technique
in certain types of cases.
Attorney General Mitchell reversed the policy which had been established
by his predecessors, Harlan Fiske Stone and John G. Sargent, and permitted
wire tapping under certain circumstances. In doing so, he expressed the view
that the tapping of wires should be permitted "when efforts are being made
to detect the perpetrators of heinous offenses or to apprehend and bring to
punishment desperate gangs of criminals. In such cases the criminals are
usually equipped with all modern scientific inventions such as the radio, the
telephone, and the automobile, and the Government is at a considerable dis-
advantage in any event in dealing with them."" He also stated that in order
to reach a decision as to the desirability of wire tapping under any circum-
stances he would want to study all available information bearing on the ques-
tion. One year later, apparently having given careful thought to the matter,
he advised a congressional subcommittee that he considered wire tapping
proper in a limited class of cases provided such technique was used upon
the express advance authorization of the Director of the Bureau of Investi-
gation or of the Prohibition Bureau and with the approval of the appropriate
Assistant Attorney General.
12
Attorney General Homer Cummings also recognized that the technique of
wire tapping was essential in certain types of cases and that the indiscriminate
use thereof should not be practiced by law enforcement officers. He'sought con-
gressional determination of the proper balance between the individual's right of
privacy and the interests of society.13
The policy of Mitchell and Cummings was only temporarily reversed by
Attorney General Robert H. Jackson. In March 1940, although recognizing
11. Department of Justice order of January 19, 1931. "No tapping of wires
should be permitted to any agent of the Department without the personal direction of the
Chief of the Bureau involved, after consultation with the Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the case." Ibid. See Hearings before House Committee on Expenditures in the
Executive Departments on Wire Tapping in Law Enforcement, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 2
(1931).
12. Hearings before Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations in
charge of Departments of State, Justice, Conmmerce, and Labor Appropriations Bill for
1953, H.R. 9349, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1932).
13. "Whether a criminal or suspected criminal should be completely protected in his
right of privacy, or whether, in the interests of society, an invasion of such right of
privacy should be permitted under the restrictions and limitations proposed in the pend-
ing measure, involves a question of balance which is peculiarly within the province of the
legislative branch of the Government." Letter of April 19, 1938, to the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 9898, and identical letter of April 26, 1938,
to the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3756. See SzN. REP. No. 1790,
75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) ; H.R. REP. No. 2656, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
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the desirability of wire tapping in "a limited class of cases, such as kid-
napping, extortion, and racketeering, where the telephone is the usual means
of conveying threats and information," he ordered that wire tapping was no
longer to be used by the Department of justice and that the Department would
no longer handle cases of other agencies if such cases had been developed in
whole or in part as the result of wire tapping.-' But, after receipt of a con-
fidential Presidential directive of May 21, 1940,10 Attorney General Jackson
reinstated the Department's policy of intercepting communications in cases
involving subversive activities against the Government of the United States.1"
Attorney General Francis Biddle reaffirmed the position taken by' Mr. Jackson.T
Thereafter, Attorney General Tom C. Clark, in writing to President Tru-
man on July 17, 1946, quoted the Presidential directive of May 21, 1940, and
said: "This directive was followed by Attorneys General Jackson and Biddle,
and is being followed currently in this Department .... It seems to me im-
perative to use [wire tapping] in cases vitally affecting the domestic security,
or where human life is in jeopardy." '  On submitting a proposed internal
security bill to the 81st Congress, he wrote: "It seems incongruous that ex-
isting law should protect our enemies and hamper our protectors." 10
Attorney General J. Howard McGrath submitted wire tap legislation for
introduction in the 82d Congress. In doing so he repeated the last quoted
statement of Attorney General Clark and indicated that such legislation would
"enable the prosecution of present, future, and past violations of laws endan-
gering our internal security, not barred by the statute of limitations, which
would otherwise go unpunished to the detriment of the Nation."2 0 Address-
ing the Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary and the Chair-
14. Department of Justice Order No. 3343, March 15, 1940, and Order No. 3346,
March 18, 1940. See also, N.Y. Times, IMar. 18, 1940, p. 1, col. 3; p. 10, col. 6; reprinted
in full in 86 CONG. REc. App. 1471-2 (1940). Mr. Jackson stated that "Under the exist-
ing state of the law and decisions, [wire tapping] cannot be done unless Congress sees
fit to modify the existing statutes."
1.5. President Roosevelt authorized the use of vire tapping in security cases provided
in each case the Attorney General gave his specific approval.
16. In his Annual Report to the Congress, January 3, 1941, he said: "Fxperience
has shownm that monitoring of telephone communications is essential in connection with
investigations of foreign spy rings. It is equally necessary for the purpose of solving such
crimes as kidnapping and extortion." See Hcariszqs before Stbcommittee Ao. 1 of Cco 1 -
wittee on the Jfdiciary on H.R. 2266 anid H.R. 3099, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1941).
17. "The stand of the Department of Justice would be, as indeed it had been for some
time, to authorize wire tapping in espionage, sabotage, and Iddnapping cases when the
circumstances Nwarranted." Quoted in Department of Justice Release, January 8, 1950.
Also N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1941, p. 4, col. 2.
18. At the foot of the letter appears: "I concur July 17, 1947, Harry S. Truman."
19. Identical letters of January 14, 1949, to the Speaker of the House of Represen-
tatives and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The proposal was
thereafter introduced in the Senate as S. 595, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), 95 Co:w-. R.
440 (1949).
20. Identical letters of January 17, 1951, to the Speaker of the House of Represen-
tatives and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. On January 23,
1951
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
man of a special Senate subcommittee in identical letters dated February 2,
1951, in which he urged early enactment of his proposed wire tap legislation,
Attorney General McGrath wrote: "The Department of Justice has been
seriously hampered in fulfilling its statutory duty of prosecuting those who
violate the Federal laws relating to national defense and security because of
the failure of Congress to enact legislation of this type." There was no change
in the wire tapping policy of the Department of Justice during the brief
tenure of Attorney General James P. McGranery.
Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., pointed up the need for amend-
atory legislation in this field when he wrote: "It is quite unrealistic and
thoroughly unreasonable that, though evidence is obtained showing clear vio-
lations of the laws against subversion, the hands of the prosecuting officers
are tied and their efforts to maintain the security of the Nation are
thwarted."'2 1 Again, on November 17, 1953, Attorney General Brownell ad-
vised a congressional committee that the work of the Department of Justice
has clearly shown the need for legislation which would permit the use of wire
tap evidence in espionage cases. He advised that there are cases of espionage
presently in the Department of Justice but that since some of the important
evidence was obtained by wire tapping, such cases could not be brought to
trial so long as the law remains in its present state.22
Others of high office and respected position have supported wire tap legis-
lation. In 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to the House Judi-
ciary Committee:
"I have no compunction in saying that wire tapping should be used
against those persons, not citizens of the United States, and those
few citizens who are traitors to their country, who today are engaged
in espionage or sabotage against the United States. . . . I would con-
fine such legislation to the Department of justice and to no other
department. I would also require that the Attorney General be ac-
quainted with the necessity for wire tapping in every single case,
and that he himself sign a certificate indicating such necessity .... ",2
Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
told the same committee that wire tapping as an investigative func-
tion is of considerable importance in cases of espionage, sabotage, kid-
napping, and extortion.2 Again, in 1950, Mr. Hoover asserted that "modern
techniques must be used in dealing with treason, espionage, sabotage, and the
1951, the proposal was introduced as H.R. 1.947, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 97 CoNG. REc. 612
(1951).
21. See note 10 supra.
22. Statement before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary.
23. Letter of February 21, 1941, to Honorable Thomas H. Eliot, Member of Congress,
reprinted in Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1, House Committee on the Judiciary,
on H.R. 2266 and H.R. 3099, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 257 (1941).
24. Id. at 112.
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kidnapping of little children." 25 Governor Dewey of New York recognized
the need sixteen years ago when he said that wire tapping was "one of the
best methods available for uprooting certain types of crimes."20 Judge
Augustus Hand of the Second Circuit has expressed the view that the state
of the law of wire tapping imposes "great and at times insurmountable ob-
stacles upon the prosecuting authorities in the detection and prosecution of
crime."27
THE LEGISLATION NEF D
It is clear that corrective legislation must be enacted if the Government is
adequately to defend itself against those who would destroy it. However,
although many people agree that there is an immediate need for legislative
action, they disagree as to the precise kind of measure which should be en-
acted. For example, some of the recent bills provide that as a prerequisite
to the use of wire tap evidence, the Attorney General shall have authorized
the institution of the interception which resulted in the acquisition of the
evidence;2s others require prior court authorization;- still others have no
such provision.30 In some, the use of wire tap evidence obtained by intelli-
gence units of the Department of Defense is authorized;31 another restricts
the admissibility of such evidence to that which was obtained by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation ;32 others have no restriction of this type.- Some
provide for the use of wire tap evidence "heretofore" obtained, provided such
evidence was obtained with the express approval of the Attorney General.-"
One of the bills permits the use of wire tap evidence in cases affecting the
safety of human life ;35 others restrict the use to national security or defense
cases ;36 another has no such restriction.3 7 These are among the more con-
troversial differences.
The secrecy, uniformity, and speed essential to a successful security investi-
gation are more likely to result if the Attorney General is given the sole
responsibility for authorizing interceptions in such cases. With each addi-
tional person apprised of an intention to intercept, the likelihood of a security
25. Department of justice Press Release, January 15, 1950.
26. 1 REvistD REcoRD, NEW YORK STATE CONsn-rUTIOAL CoM,;'Tri: 363, 372
(1938).
27. United States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 8S0, 890 (2d CAr.), cert. de:ed, 311 U.S. 653
(1940).
28. H.R 403 and H.R. 5149. Also, H.R. 8649 as to evidence "heretofore" obtained.
29. H.R. 477, H.R. 3552, and S. 832. Also, H.R. 8649 as to evidence "hereafter"
obtained.
30. H.R. 7107 and S. 2753.
31. H.R. 8649, H.R. 408, H.R. 477, H.R. 3552, and S. 832.
32. H.R. 5149.
33. H.R. 7107 and S. 2753.
34. H.R. 403 and H.R. 5149. H.R. 8649 requires express "written" approval.
35. H.R. 408.
36. H.R. 8649, H.R. 477, H.R. 3552, H.R. 5149, and S. 832.
37. H.R. 7107.
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leak is increased. To prevent such an impairment of important security in-
vestigations, the Attorney General should have exclusive authority for insti-
tuting wire taps. Centralization of responsibility also insures a degree of
uniformity. The Attorney General is the Government official most likely to
have a comprehensive knowledge of the facts in any case under investigation,
and of the need for the use of wire tapping in connection therewith. It is
clear that the Attorney General acting alone can determine the need for, and
desirability of, instituting a wire tap in any given case more quickly than
he can if the concurrence of a judge is required. That there is little to fear
from centralizirng the responsibility and authority in the Attorney General is
evidenced by the relatively few interceptions which Attorneys General have
authorized in the past.
Attorney General Brownell has proposed safeguards for the individual. For
example, he has suggested that only such evidence as has been acquired by
the FBI or by the intelligence units of the Department of Defense shall be
admissible. These are the agencies charged with legal responsibilities in the
investigation of security offenses. Likewise, the Attorney General has pro-
posed that intercepted information shall be made admissible in criminal cases
only, and then only in such criminal cases as arise out of, or are related to,
security offenses. While emphasizing the importance of providing that
wire tap evidence heretofore obtained in any security investigation shall
be admissible in criminal prosecutions hereafter undertaken, he would restrict
this admissibility to interceptions that had the express approval of an Attor-
ney General, providing further that the prosecutions in which the evidence
is sought to be used have arisen out of, or relate to, such an investigation.
There are other safeguards for the protection of individual liberties. Before
intercepted evidence could be made public through use in a criminal prose-
cution, a grand jury would have had to indict an accused for espionage,
sabotage, or other subversive activities. Then if a particular case were brought
to trial the presiding judge would have the duty of determining whether or
not the evidence obtained through the interception of communications was
material and relevant, and whether or not the interception had been accomplished
with the approval of the Attorney General.
CONCLUSION
The immediate enactment of ameliorative legislation is essential. A law
such as that which has been proposed by the Attorney General will minimize
the potential invasion of privacy and will maximize the safety of the country.
Congressman Kenneth B. Keating, chairman of the House subcommittee
which considered the wire tap bills, has said: "Invasion of privacy is repugnant
to all Americans. And it should be. Nevertheless, the safety of our Nation
and its people must be paramount."3 It is this paramount consideration which
requires that Congress act immediately.
38. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Cowmtittee on the Judiciary
on HR. 408, H.R. 477, H.R. 3552, and H.R. 5149, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1953).
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